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Uzbekistan’s Development Experiment: An
Assessment of Karimov’s Economic Legacy
KOBIL RUZIEV
Abstract
Uzbekistan’s unique post-independence experiment with development was led by Islam Karimov until his
sudden death in September 2016. Despite defying international advice on structural reforms, under
Karimov’s rule, Uzbekistan achieved an average annual growth rate of 5% in the period 1996–2016, which
was particularly impressive (over 8%) in 2004–2016. Karimov also left behind strong macroeconomic
fundamentals for his successor. Since taking over the presidency in December 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev
has introduced wide-ranging reforms, creating an impression of a de facto start to transition in Uzbekistan.
This study analyses Karimov’s economic legacy and assesses whether it has enabled or hindered the
developmental targets set by his successor.
UZBEKISTAN’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE IS UNIQUE. IN the early 1990s, while
most transition economies followed reform policy packages promoted by international
financial institutions (IFIs), Uzbekistan stubbornly insisted on choosing its own model of
gradual development. Since financial aid and technical support from the international
community are often conditional on adopting a variation of reform packages
recommended by IFIs, Uzbekistan lost access to these resources at a crucial moment in
its development path. Nevertheless, the country experienced the shallowest output fall
amongst its peers in the 1990s and managed to maintain an impressive average annual
growth rate of over 8% in the 2004–2016 period, which puzzled many neoliberal
economists. Over time, however, perhaps also emboldened by the success of its economic
policies, the government became increasingly isolationist in its international relations and
authoritarian in its domestic affairs (Akimov 2015). This eventually led to the excessive
centralisation of power under the rule of Islam Karimov and the government essentially
became a personalist dictatorship.
Karimov came to power in 1989, with the blessing of Mikhail Gorbachev, as the first
secretary of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan. He became the first president of
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independent Uzbekistan by winning the December 1991 popular vote. Although the
constitution explicitly mandates a limit of two consecutive presidential terms, he managed
to stay in power by extending his presidential terms through two referenda, which
deemed his terms non-consecutive. Hence, when Karimov won the March 2015
presidential elections, another five years of his rule seemed inevitable. However, on 28
August 2016, uncharacteristically, government sources announced that Karimov had been
hospitalised for an unspecified treatment. His death from a brain haemorrhage was
officially confirmed on 2 September 2016.
Uzbekistan has an established legal framework designed to ensure a smooth transition of
power in situations like this. According to Article 96 of the Uzbek Constitution, when a
sitting president dies or becomes unable to discharge their duties, the power of the office
will be transferred to the Chairman of the Senate in the interim period. In reality,
however, the likelihood of the transfer of power through the constitutionally prescribed
channel was very slim as the Chairman of the Senate, Nigmatulla Yuldashev, was a little-
known man with no de facto political power. Further, under Karimov’s autocratic reign,
none of the key members of his bureaucratic apparatus were allowed to share their
political views on traditional or social media and/or engage in any other forms of public
exposure opportunities, as these could potentially help them gain political capital.
Therefore, there was no de facto succession planning in place in September 2016 as
Karimov had then entered only the second year of his five-year presidency. Hence, his
sudden death, coupled with the lack of a clear heir apparent, created a moment of real
anxiety for the country, its neighbours and international observers as the consequences of
a potential power struggle in the most populous and geopolitically important country at
the heart of Central Asia could be inconceivably disruptive.
Although two high-ranked technocrats, Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Rustam Azimov who
rose up the ranks during independence, were seen as Karimov’s protégés and potential
successors, Rustam Inoyatov, the secret service chief, was also a real contender.
Appointed to his role by Karimov in 1995, Inoyatov was particularly well known for his
ruthlessness in dealing with the regime’s political opponents and suppressing popular
discontent, political or otherwise. It was, therefore, not very clear to the outside world
which of the candidates would succeed.1 However, soon after the official confirmation of
Karimov’s death, the Uzbek establishment appointed Mirziyoyev as the chief-mourner, to
lead Karimov’s funeral procession in Samarkand on 3 September 2016. Although this was
a symbolic role, it meant that, in line with the Soviet tradition of succession,2 Mirziyoyev
had gathered enough support among the ruling elite to succeed Karimov.3
Although the general public knew little of the candidates’ plans for reform, insider
rumours and anecdotal evidence created the strong impression that Inoyatov was a
1‘An Ailing Despot’, The Economist, 3 September 2016, available at: https://www.economist.com/news/
asia/21706185-their-tyrant-nears-his-end-people-uzbekistan-hold-their-breath-ailing-despot?zid=306&ah=
1b164dbd43b0cb27ba0d4c3b12a5e227, accessed 19 January 2018.
2‘In the Main News; The Chief Mourner in Moscow’, New York Times, 11 February 1984, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/11/world/man-in-the-news-the-chief-mourner-in-moscow.html, accessed
15 January 2018.
3‘Mirziyoyev Named Acting Uzbekistan President’, Financial Times, 8 September 2016, available at:
https://www.ft.com/content/63b12286-8561-3820-8f25-22d2306ed7d8, accessed 15 January 2018.
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ruthless operator and Azimov a moderniser, while Mirziyoyev was portrayed as an efficient
technocrat ideally suited for a strictly top-down administrative management system.
Mirziyoyev’s accession to power was interpreted by independent observers as the
continuation of the status quo in terms of reform sluggishness, obsession with security
and the flagrant violation of individual freedoms and liberties.4 Since taking over the
presidency, however, Mirziyoyev’s commitment to reforms has exceeded all expectations,
at least so far. He has rapidly accelerated reforms in a wide range of areas, including
the liberalisation of monetary and foreign exchange policies, trade and agriculture,
and media and individual freedoms (Stronski 2020). An important caveat, however, is to
note Uzbekistan’s very low starting point for reforms, which flatters some of the progress
made.5
This study aims to analyse the economic legacy of President Karimov and assesses its
impact on President Mirziyoyev’s reforms and development targets. In the second section,
I discuss how the initial conditions shaped Karimov’s reform strategy and policy choices
in the early 1990s. In the third section, I analyse the outcome of Karimov’s main
economic policies, including the survival phase policies of the 1990s and a switch to
growth phase policies in the 2000s. In the fourth section, I discuss the story behind the
sustained aggregate growth in the 2004–2016 period, namely, Karimov’s industrial
strategy and how it was financed. Key enabling and hindering factors related to the
country’s future growth potential are analysed in the fifth section, followed by
conclusions in the final section.
The early 1990s: initial conditions shape policy choices
Economic relations among the Soviet successor states were strongly intertwined by default
as they had been coordinated from the centre, reflecting Union-level policy preferences.
Uzbekistan specialised in commodity production and cotton, which dominated the
agricultural sector. While Uzbekistan ran an inter-republican trade surplus in agriculture
and light industry, it had large trade deficits in relation to food, energy and machinery
(IMF 1991, p. 228). The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union in August 1991 was
largely unexpected, leaving member countries, especially those in Central Asia,
ill-prepared for economic and political self-management. Some inter-republican trade
relations that made economic sense at the Union level ceased to be commercially viable
on the basis of mutual economic interests, inevitably resulting in large output losses and
the deterioration of living conditions for many (Ruziev et al. 2007).
The output shock as well as the abrupt drying up of fiscal support from the centre had the
potential to affect Uzbekistan with particular severity as a significant proportion of its large
4‘Cloning Karimov: Uzbekistan Replaces One Strongman with Another’, The Economist, 10 December
2016, available at: https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21711263-shavkat-mirziyoyev-wins-886-vote-
sham-election-uzbekistan-replaces-one-strongman?zid=306&ah=1b164dbd43b0cb27ba0d4c3b12a5e227,
accessed 19 January 2018.
5‘The Economist’s Country of the Year: Which Country Improved the Most in 2019?’, The Economist, 21
December 2019, available at: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/12/21/which-nation-improved-the-
most-in-2019, accessed 22 March 2021.
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population was poor. As Table 1 shows, Uzbekistan’s population was over 20 million in
1989, the third largest in the former Soviet Union (FSU) after Russia and Ukraine, and its
income per capita was 62% of the USSR average. While 5% and 6% of households in
Russia and Ukraine respectively earned less than R75 per month in 1989 (the effective
minimum monthly wage at the time), this figure was 44% for Uzbekistan.
Unlike most Eastern European countries, which had a long history of independent
statehood and hence could afford to concentrate their reform efforts on creating
functioning markets, building effective and credible state institutions was another
monumental challenge for newly independent post-Soviet countries. Therefore, setting up
and resourcing strong state institutions, some of which had to be created anew, to manage
their internal and external affairs, defend their national borders, maintain law and order,
collect taxes, and run and regulate newly created financial systems, was a vital first step
to building a functioning market economy. Again, this was particularly important for a
country of Uzbekistan’s size and geopolitical importance in the Central Asian region
because of the material risks arising from emerging Islamist radicalism and populist
nationalism, on the one hand, and the potential spill-over effects of civil conflicts in
neighbouring countries, such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the inherently unstable
Afghanistan, on the other.
The customary Washington Consensus reform policy package, promoted by IFIs to
developing countries ranging from the emerging economies of Latin America to the
transition countries of Eastern Europe, was also on offer for Uzbekistan. The policy
advice, comprising liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, called for the removal of
government intervention in matters concerning investment, production and exchange. It
also implicitly recommended the gradual adoption of Western-style liberal democracy in
political life (Chang 2002).
However, by assessing the overall situation in the country, Karimov’s government
decided that it would play a proactive role in dealing with the immediate economic and
political challenges, including creating a safety net to protect the country’s poor and a
strong state apparatus to prevent any potential civil strife. The official government line
was that policies recommended by IFIs did not take into account Uzbekistan’s particular
needs and hence did not fit Uzbekistan’s gradualist approach to transition in general, and
Karimov’s determination to carry out market-oriented reforms on his own terms and
conditions in particular (Ruziev et al. 2007). In practice, however, public condemnation
TABLE 1
INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR SELECTED FSU COUNTRIES
Population (million),
1989




Russia 148.0 110 5.0
Ukraine 51.8 96 6.0
Kazakhstan 16.7 93 15.5
Tajikistan 5.2 54 51.2
Uzbekistan 20.3 62 43.6
Note: * % of households with gross per capita income less than R75 per month.
Sources: Columns 2 and 3 are from IMF (1991); column 4 is from Pomfret (2003, p. 43).
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by Western-led institutions of the regime’s abysmal human rights record, including the harsh
treatment of Karimov’s political opponents6 and the widespread use of forced labour,
including child labour, in agriculture also played an important role in the government’s
decision to cool its relationship with IFIs (Akimov 2015). Unsurprisingly, with the
rejection of the Washington Consensus framework for policymaking, the relationship
between the Uzbek authorities and IFIs progressively worsened from the mid-1990s.
Some initial conditions were advantageous to the young Uzbek government, which aided
its choice of policy approach. To begin with, Uzbekistan was established in the mid-1920s in
central parts of the lands occupied by the Timurid Empire from the fourteenth to the
sixteenth century, and then by the three independent kingdoms centred on Bukhara
(emirate), Khiva (khanate) and Kokand (khanate), which ruled Central Asia until Russia
invaded the region in the second half of the nineteenth century. Tashkent served as the
regional administrative hub for the rule of Central Asia by Imperial Russia and
subsequently by the Soviet government in its early years. This history meant that the
Uzbek government had both a strong ideological narrative of independent statehood and
the robust institutional capacity to create functioning state institutions. Furthermore, it had
easily exportable tradeable goods such as cotton and gold, which jointly accounted for
more than two-thirds of the country’s export revenues in the early 1990s. These resources
meant that the Uzbek government had some policy breathing space, as it did not have to
rely on the reform-conditional help of IFIs in stabilising the country’s macroeconomic
conditions, including its balance of payments problems. Since joining the IMF in 1992,
Uzbekistan has borrowed only twice from the Fund, US$106 million in 1995 and US$59
million in 1996.7
Islam Karimov, a Soviet-trained economist and former head of Uzbekistan’s central
planning committee, was the main architect and the implementer of the Uzbek model of
economic development, which was built on the following five principles (Karimov 1995,
1998).8 First, the state would play a guiding role throughout the transition period. This
implied that the government would play a leading and proactive role in designing and
implementing its own policy reforms. Second, maintaining law and order would be a
priority. The dramatic economic and political instabilities of the early 1990s severely
weakened public institutions’ ability to uphold law and order, which resulted in the
erosion of trust in state institutions. As a result, racketeering and street gangs, alongside
self-proclaimed paramilitary mafia-type informal institutions offering dispute-resolution
6Political opponents of the regime were often sentenced to long jail terms and treated harshly in prison.
From 1999, most political prisoners and human rights activists were sent to a notorious prison, Jaslyk, in
the north-west of the country. Jaslyk was known informally as ‘borsa, kelmas’, meaning, ‘those who go,
won’t return’, and became the symbol of the repressive regime. The prison was shut down by Mirziyoyev
in September 2019 (Putz 2019).
7For comparison, Ukraine borrowed a combined total of more than US$22 billion from the Fund in the
1991–2019 period. See ‘Ukraine: Transactions with the Fund’, IMF, available at: https://www.imf.org/
external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=993&endDate=2099%2D12%2D31&finposition_flag=YES,
accessed 10 July 2019.
8According to Karimov’s official biography (‘Biography’, The Islam Karimov Academic and Educational
Complex, available at: http://www.islomkarimov.uz/en/page/tarjimai-hol, accessed 22 March 2021), the title
of his Kandidat Nauk (PhD) thesis was ‘The Structure of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic’s Industrial
Base and the Main Directions for Its Improvement’.
UZBEKISTAN’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENT 5
services, became part of daily life. Hence, restoring public confidence in the ability of state
institutions to uphold the basic rule of law was a key policy priority. The third principle was
the provision of strong social protection. This meant that the government would create a
strong social safety net in terms of staple food security, price controls, subsidies and
targeted social assistance to the most vulnerable households. The fourth was a gradual
and evolutionary transformation to a market-based economic system: the privatisation of
large enterprises in key sectors of the economy, which almost exclusively referred to the
natural resource sector, would not be immediate. This was Uzbekistan’s way of rejecting
the emergence of an economic oligarchy. Fifth, economics would be prioritised over
politics. In other words, the government would not rush to democratise the governance
system. In effect, the heads of central, regional and sub-regional government offices
would be appointed, not elected by popular vote. This also meant the rejection of a viable
political opposition.
Main economic policies and outcomes
Karimov’s main economic policies, which were broadly in line with the generic transition
strategy outlined above, can be divided into two distinct phases: the ‘survival phase’ and
the ‘growth phase’. The survival phase policies, which lasted until the early 2000s,
focused on ensuring food security, reviving the reputation and prestige of state
institutions, creating a robust social safety net to prevent potential civil discontent and
strife, setting up national monetary and financial systems, and achieving macroeconomic
stability. Among other things, building a strong and effective state apparatus involved
offering generous salary and pension packages to police, secret service and defence forces
who then effectively implemented the government’s zero-tolerance policy against street
gangs and mafia-type informal dispute-resolution groups. As a result, these organised
criminal structures were eradicated by the mid-1990s, which was relatively swift
compared to the experiences of other FSU countries such as Russia (Galeotti 2018).
At the start of transition, Uzbekistan found itself heavily dependent on the import of basic
foodstuffs and energy resources, each accounting for about 20% of the country’s imports in
1993 (Ruziev et al. 2007). To achieve self-sufficiency in basic consumption goods, some of
the land previously reserved for cotton production was reallocated to key agricultural
produce such as wheat and potatoes. As can be seen from Table 2 (Panel A), wheat
production increased by more than 520%, while the production of potatoes almost
doubled during this period. In terms of energy (see Panel B of Table 2), the production of
crude oil increased by over 80% (150% compared to the 1991 level) and that of natural
gas by over 35% during the same period.
The output contraction in the early 1990s was not as severe as in other transition
economies. The average annual growth rate for the 1993–2003 period was strong (about
4%) but not exceptional. The combination of these factors helped the country to surpass
its pre-1989 output level by 11% by 2003 (see Panel C of Table 2), a significantly better
performance compared to the average output performance of other transition economies
for the same period. By analysing various potential determinants of Uzbekistan’s ‘growth
puzzle’ such as favourable initial conditions and measurement errors, Zettelmeyer (1998)
concluded that good policy and public investments were the major explanatory factors.
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Other scholars put Uzbekistan’s success down to a combination of factors, including
favourable external conditions, namely, the resource boom (Pomfret 2003; Ruziev et al.
2007), preservation of the capacity of state institutions, good macroeconomic policy and
export-oriented industrial policy (Popov 2013).9 In particular, the government actively
used state orders, subsidised loans and undervalued exchange rates as tools to achieve
important structural shifts in the economy: attaining self-sufficiency in food, becoming a
net fuel exporter and increasing industry’s share in GDP (Popov 2013, p. 12).
As can be seen from Panel D in Table 2, the country managed to reduce its dependence on
food imports by almost half between 1993 and 2003 and became a net exporter of energy.
This helped to improve Uzbekistan’s current account (CA) position from a deficit of 8%
of GDP in 1993 to a surplus of almost 9% of GDP in 2003. The government also
tightened public spending and monetary policy, thereby reducing the inflation rate to
moderate levels by the late 1990s. The generally frugal approach to spending, which was
aided by the modest but persistent aggregate economic growth as well as the rents
generated from the natural resources sector, also allowed the government to keep debt
levels under control. By 1998, the public debt was only about 30% of GDP. Although this
figure went up to around 42% in 2003, it was not a cause for concern as the overall
budget was in a small surplus and the debt was almost exclusively long-term external
borrowing (Ruziev & Majidov 2013).
Although the Uzbek authorities always referred the appropriateness of the ‘Uzbek model’
of development to the country’s unique social and economic context (Karimov 1995, 1998),
the official narrative never went beyond the above-mentioned five principles associated with
TABLE 2
UZBEKISTAN’S SELECTED EARLY TRANSITION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, 1993–2003
1993 1998 2003
Panel A. Agricultural production, selected items, thousand metric tonnes
Wheat 876.0 3,556.0 5,437.0
Potatoes 472.0 691.0 834.0
Cotton 4,235.0 3,206.0 2,803.0
Panel B. Energy production, selected items
Crude oil, thousand metric tonnes 3,944.0 8,104.0 7,169.0
Natural gas, billion cubic metres 42.8 55.0 58.0
Panel C. Output, 1989 = 100%
Uzbekistan 87.7 91.0 111.4
All transition economies 72.9 70.8 91.0
Panel D. Selected macroeconomic indicators
Current account balance, as % of GDP −8.0 −0.7 8.9
— Foodstuff as % of total imports 19.5 16.4 11.0
— Energy as % of total imports 20.2 0.6 3.3
— Energy as % of total exports N/A 22.7 14.0
Inflation, % 534.2 29.0 12.5
Fiscal deficit, as % of GDP −14.9 −2.0 1.3
Public debt, as % of GDP NA 29.4 41.6
Sources: EBRD (2004), ADB (2007), IMF (2008).
9See also Spechler (2000).
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its gradualist approach to transition. Indeed, the exact nature of the Uzbek growth model
remained undefined (Pomfret 2000; Ruziev et al. 2007). By the early 2000s, however, it
became clear that the authorities were using the conventional ‘development’ planning
approach that prioritised growth (Chenery & Strout 1966). In this approach, the targeted
growth rates necessitate improvements in the accumulation of capital, which in turn
requires investments to be financed through domestic saving. If a country’s saving is
insufficient to achieve the required level of investment, growth targets can still be
achieved by borrowing from abroad, or by increasing the efficiency of its investments, or
both. Since domestic saving is the most important of these factors, the growth
policies in the 1960s and 1970s in the developing world focused on directing scarce
domestic savings to finance their industrialisation drive. This was done by imposing
various restrictions on the financial sector, including interest rate ceilings on bank loans,
directed lending by state-owned banks to certain industries, maintaining multiple
exchange rate regimes and restricting international capital flows. Although the
counterproductive nature of some of these repressive policies is well known in the
literature (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973), the Uzbek government went ahead with them
anyway, as it was sceptical about the underlying theoretical arguments (Williamson &
Mahar 1998) that liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation would remove detrimental
market distortions and result in a better and more sustainable method of capital
accumulation (Ruziev et al. 2007).
Emboldened by the success of the early economic policies, Karimov’s government set a
more ambitious growth target for the 2000s and beyond, with the aim that Uzbekistan would
become an upper middle income group country by 2030 (IMF 2013, p. 4). In effect, this
meant a switch from ‘survival phase’ to ‘growth phase’ policies. Despite the distortions
created in the financial sector (Ruziev & Ghosh 2009), which will be discussed in detail
later, the Uzbek authorities managed to double the 4% average growth rate achieved in
1993–2003 in the 2004–2016 period. It is important to note, however, that economic
policies were not the only driving force behind this success: there also was an element of
luck. Constrained by limited investable resources, the government decided to invest in
capital-intensive sectors such as in gold mining and natural gas extraction, which
expanded the natural resource sector. The increased production of natural resources in
turn coincided with the global resource boom, particularly after 2003 (Pomfret 2019,
p. 97), helping the government to achieve its growth targets and to keep its
macroeconomic fundamentals, including the inflation rate, the government budget deficit
and the public debt, in order.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the average annual GDP growth rate for the 2004–2016
period was more than 8%. This is indeed an impressive outcome as achieving growth
rates of 5% or higher for a sustained period of ten years or more is very rare in practice.
Although one must be cautious when dealing with official statistics, it has been suggested
recently that Uzbekistan still relies on a Soviet-style system to compile its national
statistics (IMF 2018a, p. 9), which leaves some economic activities in the services and
small-scale manufacturing sectors not fully reflected in GDP figures (Pajank 2019).
Figure 2 shows that, although all three sectors of the economy contracted in the early
1990s, the decline was most severe in the industrial sector, which shrank by almost 40%
by 1994. This decline, combined with the government’s focus on food security, which
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boosted agricultural production, meant that industry’s contribution to GDP decreased from
about one-third in 1992 to about one-fifth in 2002. In the 2004–2016 period, however, the
industrial sector grew faster than the agricultural sector. By 2016, the industrial sector
accounted for about one-third, and services almost half, of Uzbekistan’s economic
activity. Agriculture as a share of GDP, in the meantime, declined from about 37% in
1992 to about 18% in 2016.
The targeted economic policies also affected the structure of the country’s exports and
imports, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 for the period 1992–2012. In 1992, cotton fibre was
the single largest export item, accounting for 65% of exports; the second biggest category
was precious metals, such as gold, which accounted for about 13% of exports. Twenty
FIGURE 1. ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UZBEKISTAN, 2004–2016
Source: Asian Development Bank (2018).
FIGURE 2. CHANGING SHARE OF ECONOMIC SECTORS AS % OF UZBEKISTAN’S GDP,
1991–2016
Source: Asian Development Bank (2018).
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years later, the structure of exports had become much more diversified and sophisticated.
In 2012, cotton fibre was only a joint third export item alongside chemicals, each
accounting for 9% of exports. Other tradeable sectors of the economy, such as the
energy sector, also expanded. By 2012, the country was exporting noticeably more
energy (for example, natural gas), chemicals (oil and gas derivatives), machinery and
food. Exports were now dominated by energy (38% of exports), the direct outcome of a
conscious policy as the authorities invested heavily in the sector. In terms of imports,
between 1992 and 2012 the share of foodstuffs in total imports dropped from 43% to
9%, metals from 20% to 8%, and energy from 19% to 7%, while machinery went up
from 20% in 1992 to 46% in 2012. In general, the structure of the country’s imports
changed noticeably from consumption goods to investment goods between 1992 and 2012.
FIGURE 3. DIVERSIFICATION OF UZBEKISTAN’S EXPORTS, 1992–2012
Source: World Bank (2013, p. 7).
FIGURE 4. CHANGING STRUCTURE OF UZBEKISTAN’S IMPORTS
Source: World Bank (2013, p. 7).
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Figure 5 compares Uzbekistan’s income per capita in PPP terms (constant prices) to other
FSU countries. Since income per capita among these countries varied widely upon their
independence (see Table 1), their comparative performances can be better assessed by setting
the base year (1990) to 100%. Uzbekistan experienced the shallowest decline in living
standards at the start of transition, which rose slowly but steadily until the early 2000s and
then more strongly. In 2018, Uzbekistan was outperformed only by Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus and Turkmenistan. The fact that Figure 5 uses per capita figures and that the
populations of Armenia (down from 3.5 million in 1990 to 3.0 million in 2018) and Belarus
(down from 10.2 million in 1990 to 9.5 million in 2018) declined during this period also puts
Uzbekistan’s performance—its population increased from 20.5 million in 1990 to 33 million
in 2018—into perspective. Further, exceptional economic growth in Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan can essentially be explained by the expansion of their large hydrocarbon sectors.
The story behind sustained aggregate growth: the financing of industrial policy
Industrial policy strategy: focus on capital-intensive industries
The general consensus in the growth literature is that income levels are determined by a number
of interlinked factors, including the availability of factors of production and the efficiency of
their use. These in turn are influenced by other factors, such as the rate of savings and
investments, the inflow of foreign capital, the quality of institutions, macroeconomic
stability, and a country’s willingness to credibly commit to and carry out its development
plans. Yet, the cross-country empirical evidence for the convergence of per capita income
levels between rich and poor countries is dismal,10 which is hardly surprising as, unlike in
FIGURE 5. GDP PER CAPITA IN SELECTED FORMER SOVIET COUNTRIES, 1990 = 100%
(PPP $US, 2011 CONSTANT PRICES)
Source: World Bank (2020).
10The claim, of course, is valid only under the assumption of unconditional convergence (Barro 2015).
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orthodoxmodels of economic growth, the production functions of individual countries are very
dissimilar and not fully known (Hausmann & Rodrik 2003, p. 623).
However, there are more than a dozen success stories: over the 1960–2014 period, 16
countries managed to reach high income status (Cherif & Hasanov 2019, p. 5). This
indicates that although sustaining high growth rates is indeed hard, it can be done. The
World Bank (2008), by carefully studying the key attributes of 13 such countries since the
1950s, concluded that their most common characteristics included high domestic savings
and investment, openness to trade, macroeconomic stability, resource mobility, an active
role by the government11 and, most importantly, an industrial policy.
Although mainstream development policy research accepted that industrial policy has a
key role in growth acceleration (Cherif & Hasanov 2019), questions about how industrial
policy strategies can be formulated and implemented are still under debate. For example,
should countries conform to their traditional areas of comparative advantage, often
associated with labour-intensive areas of production, and gradually build capacity to enter
more capital-intensive industries (Lin 2012) or be more ambitious and invest in capital-
intensive industries with high value-added potential from the outset, that is, defy their
comparative advantage (Lin & Chang 2009)?
Uzbekistan’s version of industrial policy can generally be defined as defying comparative
advantage. Independent Uzbekistan had an abundant supply of well-educated cheap labour
and was one of the largest producers and exporters of raw cotton in the world, thus one would
expect the country to focus on developing its light industry first. However, while working
towards achieving survival phase policy targets in the 1990s, the government decided,
early on, to invest in capital-intensive industries instead. Indeed, a recent in-depth study
of the country’s per capita income growth found that practically all of the improvements
in per capita income growth for the 1996–2016 period could be explained by
improvements in labour productivity, which in turn was explained by the rise in the
capital-to-labour ratio (Trushin 2018).
Depending on the nature of the industry, investments were planned and sequenced to
promote potential backward and forward linkages. In the hydrocarbon sector, the expansion
of crude oil and natural gas production in the 1990s was followed by the setting up of
several large-scale processing plants to produce various derivative products, which could be
used as intermediate goods in other industries. For example, the Shurtan Gas–Chemical
Complex, which had a project value of around US$1 billion, started operations in March
2001. The complex consists of gas treatment and separation units, ethylene and butane
copolymer production plants and a polyethylene plant.12 The most recent and the largest
chemical plant, with a project value of around US$4 billion, started operation in 2016.
Known as the Ustyurt Gas–Chemical Complex, this unique industrial complex comprises of
five plants: a gas separation plant, an ethylene production plant, a polyethylene production
plant, a polypropylene production plant and an energy supply plant.13 Raw materials for the
11See also Mazzucato (2011).
12See the website of the Shurtan Gas–Chemical Complex, available at: https://sgcc.uz/en/site/index,
accessed 22 March 2021.
13Uzbekistan’s gas and chemical industry is managed by state-owned holding companies Uzneftegas
(Uzbekistan Gas and Oil) and Uzkimyosanoat (Uzbekistan Chemical Industry).
12 KOBIL RUZIEV
chemical industry mostly come from domestically produced ethane-rich natural gas, hence the
plants are usually built near large gas deposits offering them an uninterrupted supply of
low-cost inputs.
The automotive industry, which was built from scratch, is perhaps the best example of
industrial policy in Uzbekistan. Unlike the gas and chemical industry, the outcome of the
automotive industry is immediately observable to the general population—cars on streets
and in people’s garages—and can help legitimise the authorities’ approach to economic
development. Hence, it became a flagship project. The strategy, which is based on
assembling well-known global brands and facilitating a gradual localisation of production,
started with the establishment of a car plant in 1992, followed by production plants for
small trucks and buses in 1996 and the assembly of large trucks and buses in 2009
(Popov & Chowdhury 2016; Pomfret 2019).
There are only three car producers in the sector, all focusing on a particular segment of the
market, so they are not direct competitors. For example, UzAuto Motors specialises in the
production of passenger cars, SamAuto specialises in the production of small trucks and
buses, and MAN Auto-Uzbekistan produces large trucks and buses. The government’s
industrial strategy for the sector is implemented through Uzavtosanoat (Uzbekistan
Automotive Industry), a state-owned umbrella organisation that controls all the major
projects relating to the automotive industry in the country.
UzAuto Motors was originally established by a government decree in November 1992 as
a joint venture with a Korean producer, Daewoo Motors, in Asaka, a small town in the
Andijon region. The new plant, with an annual production capacity of 200,000 cars,
started production in 1996. In 2001, Daewoo Motors in Korea was acquired by General
Motors (GM), which resulted in the rebranding of the joint venture from UzDaewooAuto
to GM Uzbekistan in 2008. Uzavtosanoat initially owned 75% and GM the remaining
25% of the company shares. In 2019, Uzavtosanoat became a sole owner of GM
Uzbekistan and rebranded it to UzAuto Motors. UzAuto Motors has three plants located
in Andijon, Khorazm and Tashkent with a combined annual production capacity of
300,000 passenger cars. The company sells its products under the Chevrolet brand in the
domestic market and the Ravon brand in export markets. The localisation of production
has been gradual and relatively slow. According to UzAuto Motors, it reached 50% in
2019.14 The most notable example of the localisation programme was the establishment
of an engine plant in Tashkent in 2008. The plant, GM Powertrain Uzbekistan, has a
maximum production capacity of 360,000 engines per annum (Popov & Chowdhury
2016, p. 10).
In 1996, the authorities set up another joint venture, this time with Turkish capital, which
specialised in the production of buses (four models) and small to medium sized trucks. The
new plant, located in Samarkand and branded SamKochAuto, started production in 1999. In
2006, Uzavtosanoat purchased the Turkish share in the company and rebranded it to
SamAuto (Samarkand Automobile Plant).
14‘About the Company’, UzAuto Motors, available at: http://uzautomotors.com/companies, accessed 20
August 2019.
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In 2009, another joint venture to produce heavy goods vehicles was set up in Samarkand
with MAN Bus and Truck Company. The plant, named JV MAN Auto-Uzbekistan, started
the production of trucks with a gross vehicle weight of 15–50 tonnes in 2009. It has an annual
production capacity of 3,000 trucks.15 In order to benefit from economies of scale and
potential positive externalities, the government intends to expand the sector and make it
more competitive in the near future.16 For example, in March 2020, Uzavtosanoat signed
an agreement with Volkswagen Group to produce light commercial vehicles.17 It is also
working with Hyundai to produce buses, trucks and electric cars.18 As an infant industry,
however, the automotive industry is highly protected. Imported cars, buses and trucks are
subject to high custom duties, which can vary depending on year of manufacturing,
country of origin and engine volume (Popov 2013; Popov & Chowdhury 2016). There are
many precedents for protectionist policies towards fledging industries: Japan protected its
car industry for nearly four decades (Lin & Chang 2009).19
Industrial policy financing: natural resource rents and external borrowing
Although Uzbekistan has used multiple policy measures to support its industrial strategy, the
country’s rich natural resource endowment base has played a key role in shaping its overall
approach to industrial policy financing. Table 3 shows some of the key indicators relevant to
this discussion. For concise representation, Table 3 only presents five data points (1996,
2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016) from Karimov’s final 20 years in office. Table 3 also
includes 2017 when the latest data were available for all indicators. As can be seen from
row 1, Uzbekistan has generated significant resource rents, calculated as the difference
between the price of a commodity and the average cost of producing it, from its natural
resources industry. Natural resource rents are prone to wide fluctuations depending on
prevailing commodity prices. Uzbekistan’s average rents were around 9% of GDP in
1990–1999, around 28% of GDP in 2000–2009, and around 19% of GDP in 2010–2016
(World Bank 2019). The rents generated from the sector helped the government to keep
domestic finances in order and to offer a decent social safety net to the general population
and enabled the channelling of surplus funds to targeted industrial projects. These rents
also served as implicit collateral in attracting large amounts of publicly guaranteed
external loans.
In order to manage the resource rents more effectively, the government set up a special
sovereign wealth fund, the Fund for Reconstruction and Development (FDR), in 2006.
15‘About the Company UZTBM’, Uz Truck and Bus Motors, available at: http://man.uz/ru/company/
about/, accessed 23 March 2021.
16‘Development of the Automotive Industry Was Discussed’, The Office of the President of Uzbekistan,
13 January 2021, available at: https://president.uz/oz/lists/view/4077, accessed 23 March 2021.
17‘Volkswagen Caddy Light Commercial and Leisure Activity Cars in Uzbekistan’, Uzavtosanoat,
available at: http://uzavtosanoat.uz/en/VOLKSWAGEN-CADDY-LIGHT-COMMERCIAL-AND-
LEISURE-ACTIVITY-CARS-IN-UZBEKISTAN.html, accessed 23 March 2021.
18‘Hyundai Electric Cars will be made in Uzbekistan’, Embassy of Uzbekistan in New Delhi, 16 May
2019, available at: http://www.uzbekembassy.in/hyundai-electric-cars-will-be-made-in-uzbekistan/,
accessed 1 January 2020.
19For an in-depth discussion of infant industry protection measures by successful industrialised nations
when they were catching up, see, among others, Chang (2003, 2006).
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The FDR’s main objectives are to accumulate resource rents in excess of a certain cut-off
price and to use these funds to co-finance strategic government-selected projects. The
government usually spends a stable proportion of tax revenues from the natural resource
sector, equivalent to about 2–3% of GDP, and saves the rest with the FDR (IMF 2013,
p. 7). The FDR has accumulated around US$20 billion since its establishment (IMF 2019b).
Foreign direct investments (FDI) did not play a particularly strong role in the country’s
industrialisation drive until 2006 (Row 2 in Table 3). The cumulative FDI for the entire
1992–2006 period was less than US$1.5 billion. In 2016, the cumulative stock of inbound
FDI was less than 15% of GDP, which compares poorly against the CIS average of over
60%. In the absence of strong FDI flows, the government resorted to significant external
borrowing to finance its investment projects (Table 3, rows 3 and 4): in 2001, the ratio of
external debt to GDP was more than 41%. About four-fifths of these loans were public or
publicly guaranteed loans, of which more than 90% were long term (ADB 2019). From
the mid-2000s, the government started allowing external investments in the exploration
and development of new oil and gas deposits, which resulted in cumulative FDI of
around US$10 billion for 2007–2016. This, combined with the healthy expansion of the
economy, allowed the authorities to reduce, first, the ratio of external debt to GDP from
over 41% to around 24% and, second, the share of government-guaranteed loans from
over 80% to 47% between 2006 and 2016 respectively.20
Uzbekistan has also benefited greatly from the large inflow of private remittances from its
citizens working abroad. Although the economy has grown steadily since the 2000s, most of
the aggregate growth has been driven by the expansion of capital-intensive sectors, making
the growth elasticity of employment very low (Trushin 2018). Various studies have
TABLE 3
KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES, SELECTED YEARS
1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2017
Natural resource rents As % of GDP 12.2 27.1 38.0 23.6 11.4 14.7
Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI)
Million $US 90.0 82.8 173.4 1635.1 1662.6 1797.3
As % of GDP 0.6 0.7 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
External debt Million $US 2,140.0 4,714.0 4,095.0 7,879.0 15,914.0 15,563.0
As % of GDP 15.3 41.3 23.6 17.2 23.7 41.3
Public and publicly
guaranteed external debt




82.7 82.7 81.0 47.0 46.7 48.4
Private remittances Million $US – – 898.0 4276.0 2741.0 3901.0
As % of GDP – – 5.2 9.3 3.4 6.6




55.0 686.0 1,215.0 1,896.0 3,245.0 8,191.0
Sources: Rows 1, 2 and 5 are from World Bank (2019). Rows 3, 4 and 6 are from the Asian Development Bank
(2019).
20The sharp rise of the external debt-to-GDP ratio from 23.7% in 2006 to 41.3% in 2017 is explained
mainly by a large overnight drop in the value of the national currency in 2017, which changed from 4,210
so’ms per US$ on 4 September 2017 to 8,100 per US$ on 5 September 2017 (ADB 2019).
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estimated the unemployment rate in Uzbekistan at around 30% of the labour force (Ruziev &
Majidov 2013, p. 696; Trushin 2018). Kazakhstan and Russia, with per capita income levels
respectively three and five times higher than that in Uzbekistan in 1990 and which enjoyed
particularly strong economic growth in the 2000s, are the most favoured destinations for a
significant proportion of the country’s unemployed and underpaid workers. As of 2013, it
was estimated that there were around two million Uzbek citizens working in Russia alone
(Ilkhamov 2013, p. 260). According to more recent estimates (Eraliev & Urinboev 2020,
p. 258), more than two million Uzbeks were in Russia in 2019.
Unfortunately, official data for remittances are patchy (see the fifth row of Table 3). For
the 2006–2016 period, the average ratio of remittances to GDP was around 7.5%. To put this
in perspective, the cumulative net FDI flows for the 1992–2018 period was only US$13.0
billion, whereas the cumulative private remittances for the 2006–2018 period exceeded
US$46 billion. Remittance flows contribute significantly to domestic demand, and, more
importantly for the government’s industrial policy financing. They also serve as a vital
source of foreign exchange revenues which are used for both paying the country’s import
bill and servicing its external debt.
The final row in Table 3 shows the official exchange rate, which, however, does not tell
the full story, as Uzbekistan used multiple exchange rates as a policy tool to promote its
industrial strategy (Popov 2013; Holzhacker 2018). The multiple exchange rate regime
was in place for most of the time from July 1994, when the national currency was
launched, to September 2017, when the official exchange rate was finally liberalised after
Mirziyoyev came to power. For example, before the liberalisation of the foreign exchange
market, there were three exchange rates: the official rate, the bourse rate and the black-
market rate. Only legal entities with special government permission, which effectively
meant large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in preferred industries, had full access to
foreign exchange at the official rate. Exporters surrendered 25–50% of their foreign
exchange earnings to the central bank. The rest could be sold to legal entities, which
usually were small- and medium-sized wholesale and retail traders importing non-
strategic consumption goods, using the bourse rate. Finally, the black market was used by
shuttle traders and the general public. Normally, the bourse and black-market rates were
about twice as high as the official rate. Just a few weeks before the liberalisation of the
market in September 2017, the official exchange rate was around 4,100 so’ms per US
dollar, the bourse rate around 8,500 so’ms, and the black-market rate around 8,400 so’ms.21
Keeping the official exchange rate artificially low had several advantages. First of all, it
allowed the government to direct resources from export industries producing gold, minerals
and cotton to finance industrial projects in the automotive and gas and chemical industries. It
also helped to keep the prices of strategically important capital goods as well as socially
important consumer goods, such as pharmaceuticals imported from abroad, low. Further,
since most of the industrial projects were financed using publicly guaranteed external
loans, the low exchange rate significantly reduced the debt burden of favoured industries
21‘Uzbekistan Sum Jumps on Black Market on FX Reform Expectations’, Reuters, 14 August 2017,
available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uzbekistan-forex/uzbekistan-sum-jumps-on-black-market-on-
fx-reform-expectations-idUSL8N1L00DP, accessed 26 August 2019.
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(Holzhacker 2018, p. 8). However, the strict forex controls had many disadvantages too; they
discouraged independent exporters and fuelled rent-seeking behaviour by a select few, often
with strong political connections to high-level public officials.
Unleashing the future growth potential: enablers and obstacles
Since his election as Uzbekistan’s president in December 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev has
introduced wide-ranging liberalisation policies in almost all spheres of economic life,
apparently beginning the transition to a market economy. Past experience from successful
transition economies indicates that economic performance may be bumpy in the early
years of structural reforms. In Uzbekistan’s case of reform acceleration, however, the
government inherited robust macroeconomic conditions from the Karimov regime that
may have actually facilitated growth acceleration.
Table 4 shows some of the key indicators of macroeconomic stability, including inflation,
government deficit and debt, and international reserves. Inflation levels remain moderate: the
average annual inflation rate in the 2007–2016 period was about 11%. Mirziyoyev’s
government also inherited conservatively managed government finances (see the data
rows 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4): the average annual budget surplus for the 2007–2016 period
was 4.3% of GDP. Because the country also experienced strong economic performance
during this period, the share of public debt to GDP fell to about 10% by 2016. And,
interestingly, ‘the government holds almost no domestic debt [and] public debt consists
entirely of external debt’ (IMF 2018b, p. 2), which explains why the ratio of the public
debt to GDP jumped to 20% in 2017 as a result of the sharp depreciation of the national
currency in September 2017.
Table 4 also shows the country’s international reserves. Because of its effective
commitment to a fixed exchange rate and price stability, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan
(CBU) has had to sterilise large inflows of international reserves generated by commodity
exports and private remittances since the early 2000s, which has resulted in significant
reserve accumulation over time. The stock of international reserves was more than US$28
billion at the end of 2017, equivalent to about 60% of GDP (ADB 2018). As a rule of
thumb, policy analysts assess international reserve adequacy in terms of the sufficiency of
TABLE 4
INDICATORS OF MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, SELECTED YEARS
1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2017
Inflation CPI, % change 58.9 27.3 13.1 12.5 8.0 12.6
Government deficit As % of GDP −2.0 −4.1 3.4 7.3 1.9 2.1
Public debt* 29.4 59.4 21.0 10.0 10.5 20.2
Long-term debt As % of total
debt
86.2 82.5 87.7 90.9 95.7 –
International
reserves**
Million $US 1,167.0 1,212.0 4,700.0 18,049.0 26,429.0 28,077.0
As % of GDP 8.4 10.6 27.1 39.3 46.6 60.0
Notes: *, ** 1998 and 1997 figures are used for 1996 for these variables, respectively.
Sources: Rows 1 and 2 are from World Bank (2019) and IMF (2018b, 2019c). Rows 3 and 4 are from the Asian
Development Bank (2019).
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international reserves to cover a country’s import bill for three months. Since the late 1990s,
the Greenspan–Guidotti rule of 100% reserve coverage for short-term external debt has also
become a widely used measure (Jeanne & Rancière 2011, p. 907). Using these metrics, at the
end of 2017, Uzbekistan’s reserves were equivalent to 19 months of imports, more than ten
times higher than the amount required under the Greenspan–Guidotti rule. They were also
about ten times higher than the IMF’s more stringent reserve adequacy metric, which
measures a country’s potential foreign exchange needs in adverse scenarios under
country-specific circumstances (IMF 2019b, p. 44).
Holding such a large stock of international reserves offers several advantages. It helps
the government to avoid excess volatility of exchange rates, reduces the likelihood of
balance of payments crises, and ensures economic and financial stability. It also helps
to meet the country’s external obligations, including servicing its external debt
and paying its import bill, and gives confidence to international lenders and investors.
And, in the worst case scenario of government-led investments going wrong, the stock
of international reserves can help clear the balance sheets of large SOEs in priority
sectors.
Although the large stock of liquid reserves can serve as a cushion against various
shocks, it does come with a huge opportunity cost. To give an example, in February
2019, Uzbekistan launched its own debut Eurobonds at the London Stock Exchange,
raising US$1 billion in two US$500 million tranches with five- and ten-year
maturities. As the result of a strong overbooked response, which was more than US
$8.5 billion, the bonds were launched at 4.75% and 5.38% respectively.22 A simple
comparison of these rates to the very humble return of 1% CBU earns on its
international reserves (IMF 2019b, p. 44) translates into an annual opportunity cost of
around US$1.2–1.5 billion or about 2–3% of GDP. When one considers that the
government also attracts billions of dollars’ worth of external loans under government
guarantees at higher rates, it becomes clear that the opportunity costs are actually
much higher. Further, given the government’s continuous commitment to promoting
industrialisation, lending the country’s excess liquidity at low rates and then borrowing
external loans at much higher rates on international financial markets does not make
much economic sense either.
Although the economic performance was impressive in terms of some key macro indicators
under Karimov’s rule, this was achieved largely by favourably treating capital-intensive
sectors of the economy, which remain state-owned and/or state controlled (for example,
granting direct credits, undervaluing the national currency) and investing heavily in them.
As a result, practically all of the improvements in per capita income growth for 1996–2016
were explained by the rise in the capital-to-labour ratio; also, the employment rate fell from
71% to 63% during this period (Trushin 2018). The regime’s excessive reliance on state-
induced capital accumulation and its disregard for institutional reforms, therefore, hindered
the emerging private sector’s growth prospects, first, by restricting access to important
22‘Uzbekistan Emerges from Isolation with $1 Billion Bond Sale’, Bloomberg, 13 February 2019,
available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/uzbekistan-emerges-from-isolation-
with-1-billion-eurobond-sale, accessed 29 August 2019.
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resources (such as formal finance) and, second and most importantly, by failing to credibly
promote the rule of law, hence failing to protect sanctity of private property (Ruziev &
Midmore 2015). Hence, while continuing a government-led industrial strategy, accelerating
and credibly committing to reforms in these areas may facilitate greater participation by the
private sector (which, in Uzbekistan, is by definition labour-intensive) in wealth creation.
This, in turn, may induce more sustainable capital accumulation, augment aggregate growth
and make growth more inclusive.
To unleash the country’s true growth potential, therefore, Mirziyoyev’s government also
needs to reform and invest in several key areas. In particular, significant obstacles to growth
include low financial intermediation, low investment in human capital, especially at the level
of tertiary education, and a lack of credible commitment to institutional reforms, which are
fundamental in promoting sustainable investment in, and hence the accumulation of,
physical and human capital.
Startingwithfinancial intermediation, Figures 7 and8 belowprovide somebasic information
about this sector. As can be seen in Figure 6, Uzbekistan’s financial intermediation measures in
terms of the ratios of private credit and broadmoney toGDP are rather shallowwhen compared
to similar figures for the Europe and Central Asian (ECA) region.23 For example, in 2018, the
FIGURE 6. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN UZBEKISTAN AND THE EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA (ECA) REGION COMPARED, 2001–2018
Source: World Bank (2019); ADB (2019).
23Countries included in the ECA region are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Hercegovina,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
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ratio of private credit toGDPwas 43% forUzbekistan and almost 150%for theECA region, and
the ratio of broad money24 to GDP was 29% for Uzbekistan and 55% for the ECA region.
The banking sector, which was considered as one of the commanding heights in the
government’s industrialisation drive, is one of the least reformed sectors of the economy.
The share of state-owned and state-controlled banks in the total of banking sector assets
and liabilities remains more than 80% (Ruziev & Majidov 2013; IMF 2018c). The
banking sector has been mainly used by the government to channel externally and
internally generated loans to priority sectors of the economy.
As Figure 7 shows, at the end of 2017, more than 56% of all banking sector loans were
extended to SOEs and joint ventures at preferential rates, leaving a large proportion of small
and medium enterprises credit-starved (Ruziev & Midmore 2015; Holzhacker 2018).
Further, with regard to the sources of loanable funds, more than half were deposits and
loans from the government (IMF 2018c, p. 33). This, combined with very low levels of
deposits (14% of the total) from and loans (12% of the total) to the general public,
indicates that market-based financial intermediation has not fully taken off.
The next significant bottleneck has been investment in human capital. This is of particular
importance for a country like Uzbekistan, which is committed to rapid economic
modernisation. As Lucas (1993, p. 270) argued, the differences in human rather than
physical capital explain most of the variations in per capita income levels across
countries, a view strongly supported by abundant empirical evidence. Indeed,
accumulation of human capital positively and significantly contributes to per capita
output growth (Temple 1999). Education in general, and higher education (HE) in
particular, contributes to human capital accumulation through the process of creating new
ideas, blueprints and innovative technologies (Pegkas & Tsamadias 2014). As the main
driver of knowledge production, HE plays an especially important role in modern
knowledge-based economies (Olssen & Peters 2005). In well-functioning meritocratic
FIGURE 7. SOURCES AND USES OF BANK LOANS, 2017
Source: IMF (2018c, p. 33).
24Defined as the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central
government, the time, savings and foreign currency deposits of residents; bank and traveller’s cheques, and
others instruments such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper.
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economic systems, HE also serves as a catalyst for achieving social mobility and cohesion
(Ruziev & Burkhanov 2018).
Although Uzbekistan, as of 2013, spent around 8% of GDP on its education system,
only a small proportion of this budget went on HE, which declined from 10% in 1990 to
around 5% in 2013 (World Bank 2014, p. 72). In fact, Uzbekistan is the only post-Soviet
country in which the share of school leavers studying university courses has fallen
since independence (Huisman et al. 2018). Figure 8 compares Uzbekistan’s gross
tertiary enrolment figures to that of the ECA regions for the period 1998–2017.
While the ratio of students enrolled in tertiary education to their
relevant age group increased from around 36% in 1999 to 68% in 2017 in the ECA
region, it fell from 13% in 1999 to 9% in 2017 in Uzbekistan (Ruziev & Burkhanov
2018).
Uzbekistan’s industrial strategy and growth model have, so far, focused solely on
state-induced capital accumulation. However, a relatively new stream of literature
emphasises the importance of institutional capacity building in sustaining growth. In
particular, North (1994), Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that
factor accumulation is only a proximate cause of growth and that human-made
incentive and constraint mechanisms represented by, for example, rules, regulations and
conventions, provide incentives to invest sustainably in physical and human capital. In
other words, by enforcing the rule of law, by protecting property rights, and by
ensuring equality of opportunities to a broader cross-section of society,
these institutions facilitate a more sustainable accumulation of physical and human
capital and hence should be considered the fundamental cause of sustained long-run
growth.
The World Bank’s Doing Business Database and the Heritage Foundation’s Economic
Freedom Index provide interesting insights about overall economic climate and quality of
institutions across the world. However, the Rule of Law Index developed by the World
Justice Project (WJP) is a more appropriate proxy to use in our context, as it is
comprehensively constructed on the basis of eight interrelated factors comprising:
FIGURE 8. TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLMENT IN UZBEKISTAN AND THE EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA REGION, 1999–2017
Source: World Bank (2019).
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constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental
rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice.25
Unfortunately, as can be seen from Table 5, Uzbekistan still performs very poorly in all
but one of these factors in relation to its regional and global peers. In terms of the overall
Rule of Law Index, it comes 12th out of 13 countries in the ECA region and 94th of out
126 countries in the global ranking.
Although reforms aimed at improving institutional capacity building have accelerated
since 2017, a more important message to the business community is the credibility of the
government’s commitment to these reforms. In a speech on 19 May 2018, President
Mirziyoyev himself admitted that: ‘People are testing us, testing us seriously. They
wonder how long the reforms will last. They are afraid that sooner or later the authorities
will go back to their old ways’.26 Mirziyoyev’s government is trying hard to change the
image of the country for the better by accelerating the pace of economic reforms. The
government also seems to be committed to taking the country away from authoritarianism
and isolationism to individual freedom and economic openness. Indeed, in his interview
to Bloomberg, Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Kuchkarov noted that the main aim of
issuing sovereign Eurobonds was not to raise money but to send a signal to the
international community of investors that Uzbekistan was open for business and open to
external scrutiny.27 Gaining credibility, however, takes time and Uzbekistan is still in the
early stages of establishing itself as a trusted player.
TABLE 5
UZBEKISTAN’S 2019 RULE OF LAW RANK COMPARED
Factors Regional rank* (out of 13) Global rank (out of 126)
Constraints on government powers 12 118
Absence of corruption 9 95
Open government 13 119
Fundamental rights 12 109
Order and security 1 9
Regulatory enforcement 9 96
Civil justice 8 72
Criminal justice 6 67
Overall rule of law index 12 94
Note: *Countries in the region are Albania, Belarus, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, North
Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Source: Rule of Law Index 2019 (Washington, DC, World Justice Project), available at: https://worldjusticeproject.
org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLI-2019-Reduced.pdf, accessed 3 September 2019.
25See, Rule of Law Index 2019 (Washington, DC, World Justice Project), available at: https://
worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJPROLI2019_0.pdf, accessed 3 September 2019.
The estimates of the Rule of Law Index are derived from primary data measuring countries’ adherence to
the rule of law from the perspective of ordinary people and their experiences.
26‘Shavkat Mirziyoyev: People are Testing us, Testing us Seriously’, Kun.uz, 19 May 2018, available at:
https://kun.uz/news/2018/05/19/savkat-mirzieev-kacon-bular-eski-tos-eski-ammom-bulisiga-utadi-degan-
halkimizda-ali-kurkuv-bor, accessed 3 September 2019. Translation from Uzbek by the author.
27‘Uzbekistan Bond Sale Will Aid Foreign Direct Investment, Says Finance Minister’, Bloomberg, 14
February 2019, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-02-14/uzbekistan-bond-sale-
will-aid-foreign-direct-investment-says-finance-minister-video, accessed 23 March 2021.
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Concluding remarks
Uzbekistan’s distinctive post-independence experiment with development was led by Islam
Karimov until his sudden death in September 2016. Karimov’s economic policies in the
1990s were influenced by his desire to protect the most vulnerable households, which
constituted a significantly large proportion of the general population, from the sudden
shock of transition and also to prevent a sharp output loss. Emboldened by its early
success, Karimov’s government shifted its attention to growth phase policies from the
early 2000s. To accelerate growth, the government decided to invest heavily in capital-
intensive sectors of the economy.
Upon his death, Karimov left behind a more sophisticated and diversified economy and
sound macroeconomic fundamentals including moderate inflation, low government debt and
a large stock of international reserves. While these factors provided a firm foundation for the
successor government’s reforms, Mirziyoyev also inherited some fundamental obstacles.
While rejecting radical market reforms in the 1990s, the Karimov government had stated
that its gradualist policies and associated growth targets were intended to prevent a drastic
deterioration of living conditions and to strengthen social welfare. Ironically, the industrial
policy followed by Karimov relied heavily on investment in capital-intensive sectors. This
meant that the government’s growth targets ultimately became an end in themselves rather
than a means to improve living conditions. Karimov’s growth model focused on state-
induced accumulation of physical capital and failed to facilitate a more sustainable
market-based method of human, physical and financial capital accumulation. The regime
also stifled economic and individual freedoms and failed to commit credibly to market-
based reforms, thereby curtailing economic opportunities for a broader cross-section of
society.
Since his election, President Mirziyoyev has surprised many observers by his
commitment to accelerating economic reforms. Building on the sound macroeconomic
fundamentals and other enabling factors inherited from the Karimov regime, he has aimed
both to deal with the main obstacles to the country’s growth potential and to make growth
more inclusive. Mirziyoyev highlighted his overarching economic development strategy
in the presidential decree, ‘On the Strategy for the Further Development of the Republic
of Uzbekistan’, issued on 7 February 2017 (Government of Uzbekistan 2017). One of the
priority areas stressed in the decree was the development and liberalisation of the
economy. The decree broadly confirmed that the new government was still committed to
facilitating rapid industrialisation of the economy. In the meantime, the government also
aimed to make the economy more vibrant by introducing market-oriented reforms and
competition to all sectors of the economy (Government of Uzbekistan 2019a).
The current government wants to achieve its commitment to inclusive growth by
encouraging and supporting entrepreneurship and investment more in labour-intensive
sectors, which were largely overlooked under the previous regime. For example, to
expand the country’s tourism industry, the government has either simplified or completely
cancelled visa requirements for most countries and is investing in local tourism
infrastructure (Government of Uzbekistan 2019b, 2020). The government also wants to
expand light industry (Government of Uzbekistan 2019c); for example, in 1992, cotton
fibre was the single largest export item, accounting for 65% of exports; from 2020, the
UZBEKISTAN’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENT 23
authorities aim to stop exporting cotton fibre altogether and replace it by more expensive
yarn cotton and cotton fabric exports, etc. This is a reasonable strategy as, generally,
countries can create and capture more value as they move from raw material networks
(raw cotton), to component networks (yarn, fabric), production networks (the
manufacturing of apparel) and export networks (branding and marketing) (Appelbaum &
Gereffi 1994). However, the success of the policy will also depend on whether or not the
country can join global value chains as, in the twenty-first century value chains, more
value is actually created at the design, marketing and sales stages than at the
manufacturing stage (Baldwin 2013, p. 37).
One of the main reasons Karimov’s autocratic regime resisted the structural reform
packages advocated by IFIs in the 1990s was that such packages implicitly promoted
political liberalisation and democratisation as a natural counterpart of economic reforms.
Although cross-country empirical evidence regarding the impact of various measures of
democracy on economic growth is not strong (Alesina & Perotti 1994; Acemoglu et al.
2008), the virtues of economic and political freedoms are hard to deny (Friedman 1982;
Sen 1999; Hayek 2005). Further, while Friedman (1982) strongly argued that economic
liberalisation, through improvements in living standards, would necessarily lead to
political liberalisation, Hausmann et al. (2005) found that political regime changes were
statistically significant predictors of growth acceleration. It remains to be seen if regime
change can lead to growth acceleration and eventual political liberalisation in Uzbekistan.
On balance, early indications are positive.
KOBIL RUZIEV, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol,
BS16 1QY, UK. Email: kobil.ruziev@uwe.ac.uk
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